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Abstract
In this paper, we study an extension of the stable model semantics for disjunctive logic programs
where each true atom in a model is associated with an algebraic expression (in terms of rule
labels) that represents its justifications. As in our previous work for non-disjunctive programs,
these justifications are obtained in a purely semantic way, by algebraic operations (product,
addition and application) on a lattice of causal values. Our new definition extends the concept of
causal stable model to disjunctive logic programs and satisfies that each (standard) stable model
corresponds to a disjoint class of causal stable models sharing the same truth assignments, but
possibly varying the obtained explanations. We provide a pair of illustrative examples showing
the behaviour of the new semantics and discuss the need of introducing a new type of rule,
which we call causal-choice. This type of rule intuitively captures the idea of “A may cause B”
and, when causal information is disregarded, amounts to a usual choice rule under the standard
stable model semantics.
1 Introduction
The strong connection between Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR) and Logic Program-
ming (LP) semantics for default negation has made possible that LP tools became
nowadays an important paradigm for Knowledge Representation (KR) and problem-
solving in Artificial Intelligence (AI). In particular, Answer Set Programming (ASP)
(Niemela¨ 1999; Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1999) is an LP paradigm based on the stable
models semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) that has be-
come established as a preeminent framework for practical NMR with applications in di-
verse areas of AI including planning, reasoning about actions, diagnosis, abduction and
beyond (Baral 2003). An important difference between most LP semantics (including
the stable model semantics) and classical models (or even some other NMR approaches)
is that true atoms in LP must be founded or justified by a given derivation. These
justifications are not provided in the semantics itself, but can be syntactically built in
some way in terms of the program rules, as studied in several approaches (Specht 1993;
Pemmasani et al. 2004; Pontelli et al. 2009; Denecker et al. 2015; Schulz and Toni 2016).
Rather than manipulating justifications as mere syntactic objects, two recent ap-
proaches have considered extended multi-valued semantics LP extensions where justi-
∗ This research was partially supported by Spanish Project TIN2013-42149-P.
fications are treated as algebraic constructions in terms of rule labels: Why-not Prove-
nance (Dama´sio et al. 2013) andCausal Graph Justifications (CJ) (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
For instance, as an illustration of the latter, consider the following positive program P1
r1 : dead ← shoot (1)
r2 : shoot ← harvey (2)
harvey (3)
It has been showed in (Cabalar et al. 2014a) that program P1 has a least causal model I,
which not only makes dead true, but also assigns the expression I(dead) = harvey·r2·r1
capturing the successive application of r2 and then r1. The availability of such information
on justifications inside the models of a program can be of great interest for Knowledge
Representation (KR) since it allows defining new types of literals to inspect the causal
relations among derived atoms.
For instance, (Fandinno 2015b) introduced constructs like:
prison(harvey) ← harvey sufficient for dead (4)
where ‘sufficient for’ decides whether harvey has been a sufficient cause for dead by
completely relying on the semantic definitions, rather than making a syntactic analysis
of the program. Note that avoiding the latter is crucial to achieve an elaboration tolerant
representation, since causation may be affected by multiple levels of indirect effects or
the interplay with defaults like inertia. (Fandinno 2016) extends this formalism allowing
the use of ‘necessary for’ and ‘contributed to’ to capture whether harvey has been nec-
essary for (resp. contributed to) dead . To the best of our knowledge, no other formalism
integrates this kind of literals in LP or allows deriving new conclusions from information
about cause-effect relations. Unfortunately, CJ is only defined for non-disjunctive logic
programs – this holds, in fact, for all the approaches aforementioned. This is obviously a
drawback from an ASP point of view, since no CJ justifications were defined for programs
with disjunction, but also, from a KR point of view, since disjunction is a natural way
for expressing non-deterministic causation.
In this paper, we investigate an extension of the CJ semantics for disjunctive logic
programs, in which, per each standard stable model, we will obtain a class of causal
stable models providing explanations for the derived (true) atoms. As an example, let
program P2 be the result of replacing (2) in P1 by the following rules
r2 : shoot ← tails (5)
r3 : head ∨ tails ← harvey (6)
stating that Harvey throws a coin and only shoots when he gets tails. This program has
two standard stable models: {harvey, head} and {harvey, tails, shoot , dead}. In the latter,
the explanation for dead will have the form
harvey·rtails3 ·r2·r1 (7)
where rtails3 points out that the disjunct tails in r3 has been effectively applied.
We summarise our contributions as follows.
• We define a multi-valued semantics for disjunctive logic programs1 in which each
atom A is associated to an algebraic expression formed by rule labels and three
operations: a product ‘∗’ representing conjunction or joint causation; an addition ‘+’
separating alternative causes; and a non-commutative product ‘·’ that stands for
rule application. We show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
standard stable models and a corresponding class of causal stable models that provide
explanations for each true atom in each model (Section 3).
• We show that disjunctive rules are not enough to capture informal statements like “A
may cause B” and introduce the notion of causal-choice rule to represent this kind
of statement. When causal information is disregarded, causal-choice rules amount
to usual choice rules under the standard stable model semantics (Section 4).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section revises the standard stable
model semantics for disjunctive logic programs and recalls the causal algebra introduced
in (Cabalar et al. 2014a). Section 3 provides the new definition of causal stable models
for disjunctive programs and shows some correspondence properties with standard stable
models. In Section 4, we introduce causal-choice rules, explain their behaviour with an
example and, again, provide a correspondence with standard ASP. Section 5 revises some
related approaches and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs of formal results
from the paper can be found in an extended version (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016b).
2 Preliminaries
We start by recalling some standard LP definitions, with the only extension of rule
labels. A signature is a pair 〈At, Lb〉 of sets that respectively represent a set of atoms
(or propositions) and a set of labels. As usual, a literal is defined as an atom A (positive
literal) or its default negation notA (negative literal).
Definition 1 (Program). Given a signature 〈At, Lb〉, a rule is an expression of the form
ri : A1 ∨ . . . ∨Al ∨ notAl+1 ∨ . . . ∨ notAk ← B1, . . . , Bm, notBm+1, . . . ,notBn (8)
where ri ∈ Lb is a label and all Aj ∈ At and Bj are atoms with 0 ≤ l ≤ k and 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
A program P is a set of rules. 
Given a rule r of the form of (8), by head+(r) def={A1 . . . Al} and head
−(r) def={Al+1 . . . Ak},
we respectively denote the positive and negative head of r. By head(r) def= head+(r) ∪
not head−(r), we denote the whole head of r where not head−(r) stands for the set
{ notA
∣∣ A ∈ head+(r) }. By body+(r) def={B1, . . . , Bm} and body−(r) def={Bm+1, . . . , Bn},
we respectively denote the positive and negative body of r and, by body(r) def= body+(r)∪
not body−(r), its whole body. A rule r is said to be normal iff its head is a single positive
literal, that is, head(r) = head+(r) = {A} and it is said to be positive iff all literals
in it are positive, that is, head−(r) = body−(r) = ∅. A normal rule with empty body,
body(r) = ∅, is called a fact and we usually represent it omitting the body and sometimes
the symbol ‘←.’ Furthermore, we will also allow atom names to be used as labels, that is,
At ⊆ Lb, and that fact A in a program actually stands for the labelled rule (A : A ←).
1 For simplicity, in this paper, we will not consider causal literals as in rule (4), but the extension can
be done in a similar way as (Fandinno 2015b) extended (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
Any rule that is not a fact has a label from LbR
def= Lb\At. When head(r) = ∅, we say
that the rule r is a constraint and we may omit the rule label. A program P is said to
be normal or positive when all its rules are normal or positive, respectively.
We say that a set of atoms S ⊆ At is closed under P if and only if, for every rule
r ∈ P , head+(r) ∩ S , ∅ whenever body+(r) ∪ head−(r) ⊆ S and body−(r) ∩ S = ∅. We
recall next the definitions of reduct and stable model. The reduct of a program P w.r.t.
a set of atoms S ⊆ At, in symbols PS , is the result of
1. removing all rules such that B ∈ S for some B ∈ body−(r),
2. removing all rules such that B < S for some B ∈ head−(r),
3. removing all the negative literals for the remaining rules.
A set of atoms S ⊆ At is a GL-stable model of a program P iff it is a ⊆-minimal closed
set under the positive program PS .
We will also need the following definitions from (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
Definition 2 (Term). Given a set of labels Lb, a term t is recursively defined as one of
the following expressions
t ::= l
∣∣∣ ∏S ∣∣∣ ∑S ∣∣∣ t1 · t2
where l ∈ Lb is a label, t1, t2 are in their turn terms and S is a (possibly empty and
possibly infinite) set of terms. 
When S = {t1, . . . , tn} is a finite set, we will write t1∗. . .∗tn and t1+. . .+tn instead of
∏
S
and
∑
S, respectively. The empty sum and empty product are respectively represented
as 0 and 1. We assume that application ‘·’ has higher priority than product ‘∗’ and, in its
turn, product ‘∗’ has higher priority than addition ‘+’. As commented in the introduction,
product ‘∗’ represents join causation. Consider for instance a program P3 obtained by
adding the fact loaded to program P1 and replacing rule (1) by
r1 : dead ← shoot, loaded (9)
Program P3 will assign the expression (loaded ∗ harvey·r2)·r1 to the atom dead . On the
other hand, addition ‘+’ is used to capture alternative causes. As an illustration, if we
add the rules:
joker stab (10)
r4 : dead ← joker stab (11)
to program P1, meaning that the Joker stabs the victim, apart from the simultaneous
Harvey’s shot, then this new programP4 will assign the expression (loaded∗harvey·r2)·r1+
joker stab·r4 reflecting the existence of two alternative and independent causes.
Definition 3 (Value). (Causal) values are the equivalence classes of terms under axioms
for a completely distributive (complete) lattice with meet ‘∗’ and join ‘+’ plus the axioms
of Figure 1. The set of values is denoted by VLb. Furthermore, by CLb we denote the
subset of causal values with some representative term without addition ‘+’. 
All three operations, ‘∗’, ‘+’ and ‘·’ are associative. Product ‘∗’ and addition ‘+’ are also
commutative, and they satisfy the usual absorption and distributive laws with respect to
infinite sums and products of a completely distributive lattice. The lattice order relation
is defined as:
t ≤ u iff t ∗ u = t iff t+ u = u
Associativity
t · (u·w) = (t·u) · w
Absorption
t = t + u · t · w
u · t · w = t ∗ u · t · w
Identity
t = 1 · t
t = t · 1
Annihilator
0 = t · 0
0 = 0 · t
Indempotence
l · l = l
Addition distributivity
t · (u+w) = (t·u) + (t·w)
(t + u) · w = (t·w) + (u·w)
Product distributivity
c · d · e = (c · d) ∗ (d · e) with d , 1
c · (d ∗ e) = (c · d) ∗ (c · e)
(c ∗ d) · e = (c · e) ∗ (d · e)
Fig. 1. Properties of the ‘·’operators: t, u, w are terms, l is a label and c, d, e are terms
without addition ‘+’. Addition and product distributivity are also satisfied over infinite
sums and products.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that the ≤-relation has the product as
g.l.b., the addition as l.u.b., 1 as top element and 0 as bottom element. Term 1 represents
a value which holds by default, without an explicit cause, and will be assigned to the
empty body. Term 0 represents the absence of cause or the empty set of causes, and will
be assigned to falsity. Furthermore, applying distributivity (and absorption) of products
and applications over addition, every term can be represented in a (minimal) disjunctive
normal form in which addition is not in the scope of any other operation and every pair
of addends are pairwise ≤-incomparable. This normal form emphasizes the intuition that
addition ‘+’ separates alternative causes. Consider, for instance, a program P5 containing
the rule
r4 : no heartbeat ← dead (12)
plus program P4={(1), (2), (3), (10), (11)}. Program P5 has a least model that coincides
with I4 of P4 in all atoms excepting for the new atom no heartbeat, whose justification
becomes:
I5(no heartbeat) = I5(dead) · r4 (13)
=
(
(loaded ∗ harvey·r2)·r1 + joker stab·r3
)
· r4 (14)
= (loaded ∗ harvey·r2)·r1 · r4 + joker stab·r3 · r4 (15)
Expression (15) is in minimal disjunctive normal and emphasizes the existence of two
alternative causes. In this sense, any term without addition G ∈ CLb represents an
individual cause, while terms with addition t ∈ VLb\CLb will be used to represent sets
of non-redundant causes.
Furthermore, each individual cause G ∈ CLb can be depicted as a graph whose vertices
are labels. For instance, graphs G1 and G2 in Figure 2 correspond to the two individual
causes of the atom no heartbeat with respect to the least model of P5. This correspon-
dence was formalised in (Fandinno 2015a) in the following way.
Definition 4 (Causal graph). Given a set of labels Lb, a causal graph (or c-graph)
G ⊆ Lb × Lb is a set of edges transitively and reflexively closed. By GLb we denote
the set of all c-graphs that can be formed with labels from Lb. Furthermore, given two
causal graphs {G,G′} ⊆ GLb, by G · G′ and G ∗ G′, we denote the transitive closure of
G ∪G′ ∪ { (v, v′)
∣∣ (v, v) ∈ G and (v′, v′) ∈ G′ } and G ∪G′, respectively. 
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Fig. 2. Graphs G1 and G2 representing the two alternative causes of no heartbeat in program P5.
Graph G∗2 is the reflexive and transitive closure of G2 and, thus, the c-graph associated to G2.
Theorem 1 (From Fandinno 2015a). The function term : GLb −→ CLb given by
term(G) 7→
∏
(v1,v2)∈G
v1·v2
is an isomorphism between algebras 〈GLb, ∗, ·, ∅,⊆〉 and 〈CLb, ∗, ·, 1,≤〉. 
Defining causal graphs as transitively and reflexively closed is convenient for a simpler
definition of product and application over graphs. However, for the sake of readability,
we will just depict a causal graph G as one of its transitive and reflexive reductions2. For
instance, Figure 2 shows a graph G2 that will actually stand for its closure, the causal
graph G∗2. Furthermore, we will also allow writing I5(no heartbeat) = G1 + G2 instead
of (15). It is also worth to mention that each path in a causal graph may be understood
as causal chain in the sense of Lewis (1973): a finite sequence of actual events e1, . . . , en
where each ei causally depends on ei−1 (for 0 < i ≤ n).
3 Causal stable models for disjunctive logic programs
An interpretation is a mapping I : At −→ VLb assigning a value to each atom. An in-
terpretation I is said to be standard or two-valued when it maps each atom into the
set {0, 1}. The value assigned to a negative literal notA by an interpretation I, denoted
as I(notA), is defined as: I(notA) def= 1 if I(A) = 0; and I(notA) def= 0 otherwise. For any
pair of interpretations I and J , we write I ≤ J to represent the straightforward causal
ordering, that is, I(A) ≤ J(A) for every atom A ∈ At.
Since body disjunction can be captured by addition ‘+’ (Fandinno 2015b), an im-
mediate attempt for interpreting disjunctive programs would consist in just defining
I(A∨A′) = I(A)+ I(A′) and selecting ≤-minimal models. However, this naive approach
does not capture the intending meaning. Consider for instance the following program P6
r1 : head ∨ tails ← toss a : toss b : toss
where two persons a and b both give the command to toss a coin. One may expect that
2 Recall that the transitive and reflexive reduction of a graph G is a graph G′ whose transitive and
reflexive closure is G. A causal graph, in which every cycle is a reflexive edge, has a unique transitive
and reflexive reduction.
program P6 has two causal stable models, one I6 in which I6(head) = a·r
head
1 + b·r
head
1
and I6(tails) = 0, and another I
′
6 in which I
′
6(head) = 0 and I
′
6(tails) = a·r
tails
1 +b·r
tails
1 .
However, under this naive definition, there are other two additional causal stable stable
models that unintendedly “distribute” the causes of toss among head and tails. We get,
for instance, I ′′6 where I
′′
6(head) = a·r
head
1 and I
′′
6(tails) = b·r
tails
1 , and a dual model I
′′′
6
that switches the roles of a and b.
This example shows that, rather than taking the sum of all disjuncts in the head, the
evaluation of rules should consider each head disjunct independently, as defined below.
Definition 5 (Model). An interpretation I satisfies rule r of the form of (8) iff(
I(B1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(Bm) ∗ I(notBm+1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(notBn)
)
· ri ·Aj ≤ I(Aj) (16)
for some atom Aj ∈ head(r). We say that an interpretation I is a model of a program P ,
in symbols I |= P , iff I satisfies all rules in P . Moreover, if I is standard (two-valued)
we further write I |=st P and call it standard model. 
Observation 1. If r is a fact A, that is, it has the form (A : A ← ) then I |= r iff
I(A) ≥ A ·A = A (by idempotence of application on labels). 
It is easy to see that, under Definition 5, interpretations I ′′6 and I
′′′
6 are no longer
models of P6. Still, a second issue comes from selecting ≤-minimal models. Consider, for
instance, the following program P7
r1 : head ∨ tails head
which has two≤-minimal models, one in which I7(head) = head+r
head
1 and I7(tails) = 0,
plus another in which I ′7(head) = head and I
′
7(tails) = r
tails
1 . However, only the former
corresponds to the unique GL-stable model of this program, which leaves tails false
under its truth-minimality criterion. To overcome this issue, we will define an extra
partial order ⊑. First, for any interpretation I we define its corresponding standard
interpretation, Ist, as follows:
Ist(A) def=
{
1 iff I(A) > 0
0 iff I(A) = 0
We define the set of true atoms in an interpretation I asAtoms(I) def={ A ∈ At
∣∣ I(A) , 0 }.
Proposition 1. For any standard interpretation I and positive program P : I |=st P iff
Atoms(I) is closed under P . 
Then, for any pair of interpretations I and J , we write I ⊑ J when either I ≤ J or
Atoms(I) ⊂ Atoms(J). That is, I ⊑ J is a weaker relation, since apart from the cases in
which I ≤ J it also holds when true atoms in I are a strict subset of true atoms in J .
As usual, we write I < J (resp. I ⊏ J) iff I ≤ J (resp I ⊑ J) and I , J . Notice that
Atoms(I) ⊂ Atoms(J) implies I , J and so I ⊏ J . We say that an interpretation I is
≤-minimal (resp. ⊑-minimal) satisfying some property when there is no J < I (resp.
J ⊏ I) satisfying that property. It is worth to notice that there is a ≤-bottom and
⊑-bottom interpretation 0 (resp. a ≤-top and ⊑-top interpretation 1) that stands for
the interpretation mapping every atom A to 0 (resp. 1).
Definition 6 (Causal/standard stable model of a positive program). Let P be a positive
program. A model I of P is a causal stable model iff it is ⊑-minimal among models of P .
A standard model I of P is a standard stable model iff I is ⊑-minimal among standard
models of P . 
Standard stable models have a straightforward relation to GL-stable models, as stated
below:
Theorem 2. Let P be a positive program. An interpretation I is a standard stable model
of P iff Atoms(I) is a GL-stable model of P . 
From now on we use both concepts indistinctly. Note that not any standard stable
model I of P needs to be causal stable, since there could exist another non-standard
model J ⊏ I. Still, there exists a strong connection between standard and causal stable
models.
Theorem 3. Let P be a positive program. Then, a standard interpretation J is a standard
stable model of P iff there is some causal stable model I of P such that Ist = J . 
In other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between each standard stable
model and a class of causal stable models that agree in the truth assignment of atoms
(but may vary in their explanations). For instance, P2={(1), (3), (5), (6)} has two GL-
stable models, S2 = {harvey, head} and S
′
2 = {harvey, tails, shoot, dead}. Notice that
any model I2 of program P2 must satisfy I2(harvey) ≥ harvey and, thus, any ⊑-minimal
model must satisfy that I2(harvey) = harvey. Similarly, any model I2 must satisfy ei-
ther I2(head) ≥ harvey·r1·head or I2(tails) ≥ harvey·r1·tails and, thus, there are two
⊑-minimal models, I2 and I
′
2, of P2 satisfying:
I2(harvey) = harvey
I2(head) = harvey·r1·head
I2(tails) = 0
I2(shoot) = 0
I2(dead) = 0
I ′2(harvey) = harvey
I ′2(head) = 0
I ′2(tails) = harvey·r1·tails
I2(shoot) = harvey·r1·tails·r2·shoot
I2(dead) = harvey·r1·tails·r2·shoot·r3·dead
For the sake of clarity, we will write rAi instead of ri·A when ri ∈ LbR and A ∈ At.
Intuitively, symbol rAi means that among the possible consequences of rule ri, it has
caused A. For normal rules like r1 and r2 stating the selected atom is redundant and,
thus, we will usually omit the head atom label. Using these conventions, we may rewrite
the ⊑-minimal models of P2 as
I2(harvey) = harvey
I2(head) = harvey·r
head
1
I2(tails) = 0
I2(shoot) = 0
I2(dead) = 0
I ′2(harvey) = harvey
I ′2(head) = 0
I ′2(tails) = harvey·r
tails
1
I ′2(shoot) = harvey·r
tails
1 ·r2
I ′2(dead) = harvey·r
tails
1 ·r2·r3
Note that I ′2(dead) is just the justification of dead mentioned in the introduction (7).
Another interesting observation is that the sets of true atoms in each model, Atoms(I2) =
{harvey, head} and Atoms(I ′2) = {harvey, tails, shoot , dead}, respectively corresponding
to the two GL-stable models of P2. This correspondence, however, is not always one-
to-one, as stated by Theorem 3. To see why, consider a program P8 consisting of the
following rules
r1 : a ∨ b ← r2 : a ← b r3 : b ← a
Program P8 has a unique GL-stable model {a, b} but two causal stable models I8 and
I ′8 such that:
I8(a) = r
a
1
I8(b) = r
a
1 ·r3
I ′8(a) = r
b
1·r2
I ′8(b) = r
b
1
As we can see, the true atoms in both models Atoms(I) = Atoms(I ′) = {a, b} coin-
cide with the unique GL-stable model, but their explanations differ. In I8, atom a is
a (non-deterministic) effect of the disjunction r1, while b is derived from a through r3.
Analogously, I ′8 makes b true because of r1 and then obtains a from b through r2.
Programs with negation. To introduce default negation, let us consider a variation of
our running example in which shooting the victim may fail in several ways: the victim
may be wearing a bulletproof vest, the gunpowder may be wet, etc. A possible encoding of
this scenario is program P9 obtained from program P2={(1), (3), (5), (6)} after replacing
rule (1) by
r1 : dead ← shoot,not ab (17)
and rules for every possible exception in the following way
r5 : ab ← wet (18)
r6 : ab ← bulletproof (19)
From a causal perspective, saying that the lack of an exception is part of a cause (e.g., for
dead) may seem rather counterintuitive. It is not the case that we are dead because the
gunpowder was not wet, or because we are not wearing a bulletproof vest, or whatever
other possible exception that might be added in the future3. Instead, as nothing violated
default (17), the justifications for dead should be the same as in program P2. In this
sense, falsity in understood as the default situation that is broken when a cause is found4.
This interpretation carries over to negative literals, so that the presence of notA in a rule
body does not propagate causal information, but instead, it simply checks the absence of
an exception. To capture this behaviour, we proceed to extend the traditional program
reduct (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) to causal logic programs.
Definition 7 (Program reduct). The reduct of a program P with respect to an interpre-
tation I, in symbols P I , is the result of
1. removing all rules such that I(B) , 0 for some B ∈ body−(r),
2. removing all rules such that I(B) = 0 for some B ∈ head−(r),
3. removing all the negative literals for the remaining rules. 
3 A case of the well-known qualification problem (McCarthy 1987), i.e., the impossibility of listing all
the possible conditions that prevent an action to cause a given effect.
4 The paper (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009) contains an extended discussion with several examples show-
ing how people ordinarily understand causes as deviations from a norm.
Definition 8 (Causal stable model). We say that an interpretation I is a causal stable
model of some program P iff I is a causal stable model of the positive program P I .
Observation 2. Note that P I coincides with P I
st
, i.e., the reduct does not vary if we
just use the standard interpretation Ist. Moreover, it also coincides with the classical
GL-reduct PAtoms(I). 
Theorem 4. Let P be a labelled program. Then, J is a standard stable model (i.e.
Atoms(J) is a GL-stable model) of P iff there is some causal stable model I of P such
that Ist = J (i.e. Atoms(I) = Atoms(J)). 
Theorem 4 is an immediate consequence of Observation 2 plus Theorem 3. Further-
more, it is easy to see that program P9 has the same two standard stable models of P2.
The reduct of P9 with respect to interpretations I2 and I
′
2 is just the result of removing
not ab from the body of (17). Thus, these are also the two causal stable models of P9.
On the other hand, a program P10, obtained by adding the fact wet to program P9, has
two standard stable models {harvey, head ,wet} and {harvey, tails,wet} and two corre-
sponding causal stable models. Note that the reduct of program P9 w.r.t. I9 and I
′
9 is
just the result of removing rule (17) and, thus, there is no justification for dead in any
of these two causal stable models.
4 Causal-choice rules
Disjunctive rules are useful for representing non-deterministic causal laws that represent
the possible outcomes of an experiment like throwing a coin. However, disjunction alone
is not enough to capture the causal nature of some non-deterministic statements of the
form “A may cause B.” In order to illustrate this limitation, consider the statement “An
infection may cause the patient to have fever .” A frequent way to represent this kind of
statements in ASP is using a choice rule as follows
r1 : fever ∨ not fever ← infection (20)
infection (21)
Program P11 consisting of rules (20-21) has two standard stable models S11 = {fever}
and S′11 = {infection, fever} and, in fact, two respective causal stable models I11 and
I ′11:
I11(infection) = infection
I11(fever) = 0
I ′11(infection) = infection
I ′11(fever) = infection·r
fever
1
which obtain the expected result. However, the causal behaviour of (20) is not exactly
what we look for but, instead, would correspond to the assertion “infection may cause
fever or fever is false.” This becomes evident if we add a second external cause for fever :
r2 : fever ← (22)
The unique standard stable model of the new program P12 formed by P11 plus (22) is
now S′11, since once fever is fixed by r2, the choice r1 is forced to cause fever . This
“forced causation” is irrelevant when we do not consider causal explanations: in fact,
under GL-stable models semantics, once we add a fact for fever , rule r1 becomes a
tautology and can always be safely removed from the program. However, r1 cannot be
removed under the causal semantics (since it expresses some relation between infection
and fever) and, as (22) fixes fever true for any model I, the corresponding reduct of r1
will mandatorily be:
r1 : fever ← infection (23)
Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that we get a unique causal stable model I12
of program P12 that satisfies I12(fever) = infection·r
fever
1 + r2. In other words, we get
now that infection is always forced to be one of the causes of fever , although the only
addition we made was providing an (independent) alternative cause r2.
For capturing the correct meaning of “may cause” in this example, we should have
obtained a second causal stable model I ′12 where I
′
12(fever) = r2, that is, fever is still
true due to r2 but the infection does not result to be an alternative cause of fever
this time. The problem with this second model is that while Atoms(I ′12) = Atoms(I12)
means that the reduct for both models will always coincide, and we also have5 I ′12 ⊏ I12,
meaning that no program may have both interpretations as ⊑-minimal models of such a
reduct. Hence, it is clear that no program using the previous language can capture the
intended models of this example. We introduce next the notion of causal-choice rule (and
its associated program reduct) that intuitively captures the idea of “A may cause B” and
that, when causal information is disregarded, amounts to a usual choice rule under the
standard stable model semantics.
Definition 9. A causal-choice rule is an expression of the form of
ri : A1 ∨ . . . ∨Al ∨ notAl+1 ∨ . . . ∨ notAk f B1, . . . , Bm, notBm+1, . . . ,notBn (24)
where ri ∈ Lb is a label and all Aj ∈ At and Bj are atoms. For every causal-choice rule r
of the form of (24), by rule(r) we denote its corresponding rule of the form of (8), i.e.,
rule(r) corresponds to replacing ‘ f ’ by ‘ ← .’ 
Definition 10. The reduct of a program with causal-choice rules P , with respect to an
interpretation I, in symbols also P I , is obtained by
1. removing every causal-choice rule r such that I does not satisfy rule(r),
2. replacing the remaining causal-choice rules r by rule(r)
3. apply the reduct of Definition 7 to the result of the previous two steps.
An interpretation I is a causal stable model of a program with causal-choice rules P iff
I is a causal stable model of P I . 
We can now represent the variation of our running example with program P13:
r1 : fever f infection (25)
r2 : fever ← (26)
infection (27)
On the one hand, the reduct of program P13 w.r.t. I12 is the program obtained by
replacing the choice rule (25) by its corresponding rule (23). It is easy to check that I12
5 Indeed, I′12(fever) = r2 < infection·r
fever
1
+ r2 = I12(fever) while I12(infection) = I
′
12(infection) =
infection.
is a ⊑-minimal model of P
I12
13 and, thus, a causal stable model of P13. On the other
hand, the reduct of program P13 w.r.t. I
′
12 is the result of removing rule (25) and, thus,
I ′12 is also a ⊑-minimal model of P
I′12
13 and a causal stable model of program P13.
As explained before, this example illustrates that there are programs with causal-
choice rules whose causal stable models cannot be captured by programs without them.
Despite that, it can be shown that, when causal information is disregarded, causal-choice
rules behave like standard choice rules. The following definition and Theorem 5 below
formalise this intuitive idea.
Definition 11. For any program P and causal-choice rule r ∈ P of the form of (24), by
ch(r, P ), we denote the program obtained after replacing r by a set of rules of the form of
ri : A1∨. . .∨Aj∨notAj∨. . .∨Al∨notAl+1∨. . .∨notAk ← body(r) (28)
per each atom Aj ∈ head
+(r). 
As an example, the causal-choice (25) in a program P would be replaced by the stan-
dard choice (20) in ch((25), P ).
Theorem 5. Let P be a program with causal-choice rules, r ∈ P be a causal-choice rule
and let I be a standard interpretation. Then, I is a standard stable model of P iff I is a
standard stable model of ch(r, P ). 
5 Related Work
The most obvious related work is our previous approach for non-disjunctive programs (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
The following result established a one-to-one correspondence between our causal stable
models and the CJ-stable models from (Cabalar et al. 2014a).
Theorem 6. Let P be a normal program, for every causal stable model I, there is a
unique CJ-causal stable model J such that Ist = Jst, and vice-versa. Furthermore, if I
and J are respectively a causal stable model and CJ-stable model of P such that Ist = Jst,
then there is a justification G′ = λ(G) such that G′ ≤ J(A) for every atom A and
justification G ≤ I(A), where λ(G) denotes the result of removing every edge containing
an atom label A ∈ At in the causal graph G. 
Note, that causal justifications with respect to any causal stable model are always
a (possibly strict) subset of the causal justifications with the corresponding CJ-stable
model. To illustrate this difference, consider the following normal program P14
r1 : a ← r3 : b ← a r4 : c ← a r5 : d ← b, c
whose unique CJ-stable model satisfies I14(d) = G1 with each G1 being the causal
graph G1 depicted in Figure 3. Similarly, the unique causal stable model of program P14
satisfies I14(d) = G
′
1 where G
′
1 is the result of removing every edge containing an atom
label A ∈ At in the causal graph G1. However, if we consider a program P15 obtained by
adding rule (r2 : a ← ) to program P14, then this program has a unique CJ-stable model
that satisfies J15(d) = G1+G2+G3 +G4 with each Gj the corresponding causal graph
depicted in Figure 3. On the other hand, under our current definition, program P15 has a
unique causal stable model satisfying I15(d) = G
′
1+G
′
2 with G1 and G2 being the result
r1
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Fig. 3. Causal graphs associated with d by the unique CJ-stable model of program P14.
of removing every edge containing an atom label A ∈ At in the causal graphs G′1 and G
′
2,
respectively. Note that causal graphs G3 and G4 can be considered somehow redundant
with respect to G1 and G2 and, in this sense, our current definition, not only extends
the definition of causal stable models given in (Cabalar et al. 2014a) for disjunctive logic
programs, but also better captures the notion of non-redundant justification for non-
disjunctive programs (for more details we refer to Cabalar and Fandinno 2016b).
Papers on reasoning about actions and change (Lin 1995; McCain 1997; Thielscher 1997)
have been traditionally focused on using causal inference to solve representational prob-
lems (mostly, the frame, ramification and qualification problems) without paying much
attention to the derivation of cause-effect relations. Perhaps the most established AI ap-
proach for causality is relying on causal networks (Pearl 2000). In this approach, it is
possible to conclude cause-effect relations like “A has caused B” from the behaviour of
structural equations by applying the counterfactual interpretation: “had A not happened,
B would not have happened.” As discussed by Hall (2004), this counterfactual-based def-
inition corresponds to recognising some kind of dependence relation in the behaviour
of a non-causal system description. As opposed to this, Hall considers a different (and
incompatible) definition where causes must be connected to their effects via sequences
of causal intermediates, something that is closer to our explanations in terms of causal
graphs. A similar approach has also been studied by Vennekens (2011) in CP-logic.
Focusing on LP, our work obviously relates to approaches on justifications (Specht 1993;
Pemmasani et al. 2004; Pontelli et al. 2009; Dama´sio et al. 2013; Denecker et al. 2015; Schulz and Toni 2016)
which, as mentioned in the introduction, are limited to non-disjunctive programs. Among
these, Why-not Provenance Justifications (WnP) (Dama´sio et al. 2013) share with our
approach a semantic definition in terms of algebraic operations. A formal compari-
son was done in (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016a). With respect to (Pontelli et al. 2009),
a formal relation has not been established yet. We conjecture that our causal expla-
nations can be seen as non-redundant off-line justifications with respect to a kind of
“maximal set of assumptions.” Still, this would apply to non-disjunctive programs only,
since (Pontelli et al. 2009) do not cover disjunction.
A more far-fetched resemblance exists with respect to other meta-programming tech-
niques for ASP debugging (Gebser et al. 2008; Oetsch et al. 2010) which have a different
goal, tackling the question of why some interpretations are not stable models of a (possi-
bly disjunctive) program without negative literals in the head. These approaches can be
used to generate explanations for a set of literals L, with respect to an interpretation I,
by recursively asking why I\L is not an stable model of the program. However, the given
explanation cannot be used for our purpose of identifying causal relations, since it just
provides a plain set of rules, without distinguishing which of them are a part of the same
justification or which are their dependences.
6 Conclusions and open issues
We have provided an extension of a logic programming semantics based on causal justifi-
cations to cope with disjunctive programs. As in the previous, non-disjunctive approach,
each true atom is assigned a set of non-redundant justifications, expressions built with
rule labels and three algebraic operations: addition, product and application. We have
shown that, for each standard stable model of a program, there is a class of causal stable
models that capture the different ways in which (the same) true atoms can be justified.
We have also shown that disjunctive rules are not enough to capture informal statements
like “A may cause B” and introduced causal-choice rules to represent them.
Regarding complexity, since the existence of causal stable models is completely deter-
mined by the existence of standard stable models, it intermediately follows that this prob-
lem is ΣP2 -complete (Eiter and Gottlob 1995). For query answering, it has been shown
in (Cabalar et al. 2014b), that deciding whether a causal graph is a brave necessary cause
is ΣP2 -complete, even in the non-disjunctive case. Whether disjunction makes the problem
harder is still an open question.
Several other topics remain open for future study. Interesting topics include a complex-
ity assessment or studying an extension to arbitrary theories as with Equilibrium Logic
(Pearce 2006) for the non-causal case. Further ongoing work is focused on implementa-
tion, the introduction of strong negation, a formal comparative with (Pontelli et al. 2009)
and (Schulz and Toni 2016).
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